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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
prejudiced by the jury charge, which allowed the panel to consider both wholesale and retail prices.
This being the case, the Court apparently felt the need to fill the gap left
by People v. Rupoli,26 involving similar facts, in which the larceny conviction
was sustained and the precise question as to market value was left unanswered
by the Court.
It is also pointed out that in jurisdictions having a penal provision
similar to that of New York the term market value is construed in a like
27
manner.
REcIDIVIST STATUTES: SINGLE TRIAL FOR MULTIPLE OFFENSES CONSTRUED AS

SINGLE CoNVIcTION
Section 1942 of the New York Penal Law, dealing with fourth felony
offenders, provides inter alia that:
For purposes of this section, conviction of two or more crimes
charged in separate counts of one indictment or information, or in two
or more indictments or informations consolidated for trial, shall be
deemed to be only one conviction.
The consolidation for trial, to which this section refers, is that permitted
by the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 279, where provision is
made for the charging of crimes of the same or similar character in separate
counts of one indictment, and if two or more indictments are found in such
cases, the court may order them to be consolidated.
In People v. Fay28 the relator had been convicted of three crimes in the
State of Pennsylvania. The second and third convictions were for robbery
and attempted robbery respectively, both committed on the same day against
different victims. The crimes were charged on separate indictments, but were
tried simultaneously. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both offenses,
and sentences were imposed to be served consecutively. Subsequently, he was
convicted in New York of a felony and sentenced as a fourth felony offender
to an indefinite term of 15 years to life.
Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced by the relator on the ground
that he was improperly sentenced. He contended that, for purposes of Section
1942 of the Penal Law, the second and third indictments were consolidated
for trial and constitute only one conviction. The Supreme Court dismissed
the writ on the theory that:
26. 503 N.Y. 595, 105 N.E.2d 485 (1952). Defendant was convicted of the crime
of receiving stolen goods, which under Section 1308 of the New York Penal Law, makes
the crime a felony if the goods have a market value in excess of one-hundred dollars.
The property involved had a wholesale value of $120, and a retail value of $201. The
Court unanimously sustained a felony conviction, regardless of the fact that the trial judge
had allowed the jury to consider retail price only. The correctness of this charge was not
considered, since defendant's counsel had not excepted to the same, and in any case, the
felony conviction could have been sustained on wholesale value alone being in excess
of $100.
27. See, People v. Irrizardi, supra note 21, at 146, 182 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1959).
28. People v. Fay, 6 N.Y.2d 88, 188 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1959).
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The record does not show the existence in the Pennsylvania criminal
action of an order, written or oral, expressly directing or using the
words consolidation of the two indictments for trial. Since the term
joint trials is unknown in our criminal practice the two must be
distinguished.
The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion.P On appeal the decision
below was reversed. 30 The Court of Appeals held that where multiple criminal
charges have been decided at one trial, in New York or elsewhere, and the
crimes have sufficient characteristics in common so as to have permitted
consolidation under Section 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial
shall be deemed a consolidated trial, resulting in but one conviction for purpose of the recidivists statutes.
The problem before the Court of Appeals was to resolve the meaning of
the phrase "consolidated for trial" as used in the provision in question. In
order to do this it was first necessary to determine what the Legislature was
endeavoring to accomplish. This purpose was clearly illustrated in Bravatta v.
Morhaus.31 There, the Court, speaking about Section 1942 said:
It is harsh in its impact upon the individual, and in many instances
we feel that it is unduly harsh ... The Legislature has indicated an
intent, in specified cases, to mitigate the harshness of the statutory
rule, by the words contained in the last sentence of the section.
If the purpose illustrated by the quotation is to be accomplished the
statute ought to be construed in favor of the individual. Construing it in this
manner would also be in accordance with the recognized policy in interpreting
penal statutes. As the trial court observed, the Penal Code is not helpful in
arriving at a useful definition of "consolidated for trial," nor is it helpful to
compare it with "consolidation" as it is used in civil trials.8 2 In the latter
case any comparison which could be made would very likely be unrelated to
the legislative purpose. The interpretation desired is one which is logically
defensible but is also consistent with the legislative intent. In this case this
can be achieved by looking to the other provisions of Section 1942 and noting
how the problem of out-of-state convictions is resolved. In dealing with the
classification of crimes into misdemeanors or felonies, for the purpose of the
recidivist statutes, the New York courts look at the criminal acts in the light
of the applicable New York law. Notwithstanding the fact that the crime
may have been a felony in the foreign jurisdiction, if under New York law the
crime would have been a misdemeanor, it will be so treated for the purposes
of the recidivist statutes.3 3 This is in substance the result of the Court of
Appeals decision in the instant case. This result is justified in that it mitigates
29.
30.
31.
32.

People v. Fay, 7 A.D.2d 640, 179 N.Y.S.2d 851 (2d Dep't 1958).
Supra note 28.
Bravatta v. Morhaus, 186 Misc. 893, 63 N.Y..2d 451 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
Kennedy v. Empire State Underwriters of Watertown N.Y., 202 S.C. 38, 24 S.E.2d

78 (1950).
33. Newman v. Foster, 297 N.Y. 27, 74 N.E.2d 224 (1947).
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the harshness of the statute in accordance with the legislative purpose, and is
consistent with the accepted method of treating out of state convictions for
purposes of the recidivist statutes in general.
EFFECT OF OUT OF STATE CONVICTION UPON RECIDMST STATUTES

Sections 1941 and 1942 of the New York Penal Law require a sentencing
judge, in applying the recidivist statutes, to consider defendant's out-of-state
convictions. When the crime is a felony where committed, but only a misdemeanor if committed in New York, the statutes require that the foreign felony
34
conviction be treated as only a misdemeanor.
Since the foreign indictment usually alleges more than the bare statutory
crime, do the New York courts consider only the statute, the indictment, or
both, in determining whether the foreign felony conviction is to be treated as
a misdemeanor in New York?
The New York rule, set out in People v. Olah,35 is that if the crime as
defined by the foreign statute could under any set of facts be only a misdemeanor if committed in New York, the New York courts will treat the
crime as a misdemeanor, even though the indictment charges an act which
would be a felony if committed in New York. 6
In People v. Jackson3 7 defendant contended that since one of the two
acts defined by the foreign statute under which he was convicted was only a
misdemeanor under New York law, 8 the indictment should be disregarded, and
the foreign felony conviction must be treated as a misdemeanor in New York.
The Court of Appeals rejected this contention, holding that the indictment
must be considered when it plainly charges only that crime which would be a
felony under New York law.39
The Court noted, that the purpose of the Olak rule is to eliminate discrimination in New York courts against defendants because they have been
convicted of foreign felonies which might not be felonies if committed in New
York. This decision limits the effect of the Olak rule, but preserves its intent,
for it denies discrimination in favor of such defendants.
DOUBLE JEOPADY-NEW YoRK "WAVR" DocTRnq
GREEN CASE

SURvns IMPACT OF

Defendant's failure to except to an erroneous jury charge precludes his
raising that exception on appeal. 40 In People v. Cipolla,41 the trial judge
erroneously charged that sodomy second degree is included in or is a lesser
N.Y. Pr. LAW §§ 1941-1942.
35. 300 N.Y. 96, 89 N.E.2d 329 (1949).
36. People v. Martin, 308 N.Y. 823, 125 N.E.2d 873 (1955); People v. Kronich,
308 N.Y. 866, 126 N.E.2d 307 (1955).
37. 5 N.Y.2d 243, 183 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1959).
38. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 405.
39. N.Y. Par. LAW § 404.
34.

40.

N.Y. COD

Cxrm. PRoc. § 420-a; People v. Cohen, 5 N.Y.2d 282, 184 N.Y.S.2d

340 (1959).
41. 6 N.Y.2d 922, 190 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1959).
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